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Judicial activism, economic theory and
the role of summary judgment in
Sherman Act conspiracy cases:
the illogic of Matsushita
BY JAMES F. PONSOLDT* AND MARC J. LEWYN**
The proper role of neoclassical economic theory in the resolution
of antitrust disputes will continue to be debated into the next
administration.' The Reagan Administration has succeeded in
persuading the Supreme Court to incorporate laissez-faire
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, J.D.,
Harvard University, 1972.
"" Member of the District of Columbia Bar. J.D., University of
Georgia, 1986.
AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors acknowledge the significant assistance in
the preparation of this article of Michael Youtt, a member of the 1989
class of the University of Georgia School of Law.
I The existence and contents of this two volume symposium are
evidence of the continuing debate. See, e.g., Ponsoldt, "Introduction,"
33 THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 201 (1988).
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assumptions and goals into Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts2
jurisprudence in at least three major decisions,3 although the
long-range importance of the holdings in two of those cases
remains somewhat in doubt.
One of those decisions, however, reflects more than just a
disagreement about applications of the antitrust laws. In Mat-
sushita, supra, the Court, ordering summary judgment for defen-
dants at the urging of the Justice Department, has tampered with
fundamental "right-to-jury" principles' and, in preferring eco-
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1987); 38 Stat. 730 (1914), codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1987).
3 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574 (1986); Cargill v. Montfort, 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986); Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
4 Both Cargill, supra, and Business Electronics, supra, reflect
obvious compromises between competing views, in which the Court
went out of its way to purport to rely upon existing precedent. Cargill
merely applied the Court's holding in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
0-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977), to require that private plaintiffs show anti-
trust injury in equity suits as well as damage actions. The Court rejected
the more extreme view of the Justice Department that a private competi-
tor never should be allowed antitrust standing to challenge a merger.
The growing involvement of the states, and possibly of consumer
classes, in challenging mergers, should reduce the impact of Cargill.
The Court in Business Electronics expressly reaffirmed as modes of
analysis the per se rule for vertical price-fixing and the market-based
rule of reason for vertical non-price restraints. It remains to be seen
whether the Court will allow the plaintiff in a distributor termination
case, where the motive for the termination is to impede retail price com-
petition, as in Business Electronics, to succeed in proving "unreason-
ableness" by showing anticompetitive motive, without proving that
defendants possess a high market share. See generally, Flynn, "The 'Is'
and 'Ought' of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto," 71 CORNELL LAW
REvIEW 1095 (1986).
5 It has been held that, even in an equity case in which the Seventh
Amendment jury right would not apply, a counterclaim for damages
triggers the right to a jury trial on common issues, Beacon Theatres v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See also, for a discussion of the right to
a jury even in complex antitrust cases, U.S. Financial Securities Litiga-
tion, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
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nomic illusion to the reality of a pretrial record, has revealed
itself as capable of uncommon judicial activism. Briefly, the
decision in Matsushita (i) ignores existing Sherman Act summary
judgment precedent; 6 (ii) undermines longstanding rules of con-
struction applicable in all summary judgment cases, thereby
judicially amending the language of Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P., itself;'
(iii) substitutes the deductive assumptions of neoclassical eco-
nomic theory for record evidence, standing logic on its head;' (iv)
misapplies predatory pricing theory in the context of a conspiracy
case;9 and (v) creates a standard for proof of a conspiracy in civil
Sherman Act cases which is far greater than the standard of proof
6 See, discussion at nn. 63-72 and accompanying text.
7 See, discussion at nn. 59-62 and accompanying text.
8 In holding that since rational businessmen would not engage in
long-term predatory pricing, according to economic theory (because
they would never be able to recoup their losses in hypothesized competi-
tive markets), they therefore did not do so in combination, the Court
ignored uncontradicted record evidence that defendants did engage in
long-term, parallel low or below cost pricing in the United States. Obvi-
ously, the economic theory relied upon by the Court failed to factor in
the possibility of an additional motive: full employment for Japanese
workers, subsidized by Japanese consumers and the Japanese govern-
ment, which results from defendants' penetration of the American mar-
ket. As an anecdotal aside, the reasoning of the Court in Matsushita
(although not the result) is the target of private hilarity among Japanese
lawyers and economists.
9 Assuming that the Court and the economic theorists it relied
upon were correct that no rational businessman would engage in unilat-
eral long-term predatory pricing because such pricing conduct would be
against his economic self-interest, such an "against economic self-
interest" characterization constitutes solid evidence that defendants did
act in concert when engaging in consciously parallel pricing conduct, as
will be discussed below. In other words, the Court applied its economic
theory to reach a conclusion directly contrary to the correct one. Long-
standing conspiracy law teaches that if two or more persons consciously
are engaging in complementary or parallel conduct which neither one
would engage in independently, they likely are acting pursuant to a
mutual understanding-a conspiracy. See, discussion at nn. 116-126 and
accompanying text.
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for conspiracies in criminal cases, including criminal Sherman
Act cases.'I
The primary concern of this article is the last noted effect of
the Matsushita decision. By advocating and adopting the Mat-
sushita standard for civil Sherman Act conspiracies, and main-
taining a more liberal standard for proof of criminal
conspiracies, the Justice Department and a majority of the Court,
respectively, have stepped into the overtly political arena and
implicitly disavowed fundamental tenets of our legal system."
The schizophrenic attitude toward proof of Sherman Act conspir-
acies reflects the administration's underlying inconsistency
between "laissez-faire" and "tough on crime"; the Administra-
tion fails to recognize that criminal antitrust enforcement is as
interventionist as is civil enforcement of the same statutes.
This article will briefly discuss administration antitrust
enforcement policy, through reference to speeches and policy
statements. It will then describe the Matsushita decision and
traditional antitrust summary judgment standards. The article
will review and compare existing criminal conspiracy standards
and their development and application in criminal antitrust cases.
Finally, it will take a closer look at the proper relationship
between economic principles and the conspiracy standard when
proof of conspiracy must be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence of parallel business conduct.
10 See, discussion at nn. 82-112 and accompanying text.
11 That the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for proof of ele-
ments of a criminal offense, incorporated in the due process clause, is
stricter than the "preponderance of the evidence" test for proof of ele-
ments of a civil action should not require citation or elaboration. The
Matsushita standard for proof of the existence of a conspiracy in a civil
action has been expressly disavowed as too strict by the courts in crimi-
nal cases, as will be discussed below, yet the Matsushita standard must
be satisfied by a civil action plaintiff at the summary judgment stage. At
best, Matsushita creates major incentives for discovery abuses by anti-
trust defendants, including perjury and document destruction. At worst,
Matsushita represents a retreat from basic democratic principles
embodied in the Seventh Amendment.
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I. Background
During the Reagan Administration's tenure, an interesting
dichotomy has developed regarding federal antitrust policy. On
the one hand, the administration, through its enforcement
agencies-the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission-advocates strict enforcement of criminal antitrust
law, while on the other hand, it declines to seek, and even
opposes, civil liability for corporations which implement activities
restraining commerce. The cause of this inconsistency is the
Reaganites' desire to stop a perceived escalation of "criminality"
coupled with an unwavering, if not illogical, dedication to laissez-
faire economics and a noninterventionist "regulatory" policy,
even with respect to substantially the same kind of underlying
business conduct.
Although identified with the Chicago school antitrust
approach, 2 the Reagan Administration's "get tough" policy
towards criminal antitrust enforcement distinguishes it. 3 Several
characteristics of the Justice Department's recent activities high-
light this increased emphasis on criminal enforcement. First, the
three most recent Antitrust Division leaders, Paul McGrath,
Douglas Ginsburg, and Charles Rule, 4 have consistently identi-
12 When referred to throughout this article, the term, "Chicago
school," should be construed in its broadest sense to refer to the well-
known legal analysis which stresses efficiency-based rationales. Proba-
bly the seminal and assuredly the most influential study of Chicago
school reasoning applied in the area of antitrust law is Judge Robert
Bork's work, The Antitrust Paradox. Also, the academic writings and
judicial opinions of Judge Richard Posner provide clear examples of the
application of Chicago-school theories. See, e.g., Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979).
13 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is responsi-
ble for the majority of the Reagan Administration's antitrust law pro-
posals. Citations to the specific statutory proposals that embody the
administration's philosophy will occur throughout the article.
14 Each of these three men has served as Assistant Attorney General
of the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. McGrath served from
1982 to 1987, Ginsburg from 1984 to 1987 and Rule's tenure began in
1986. He is still the Division head.
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fled tough criminal enforcement as the top priority of the Divi-
sion."I Second, recent statistics provide evidence of the declared
"get tough" rhetoric. The Justice Department currently has more
than 140 grand juries empaneled solely to investigate antitrust
violations" and the Department has initiated "three times the
number of criminal cases" as the Carter Administration.'7 This
increase has resulted in "two and one-half times the number of
fines" and an increase in the frequency and length of jail
sentences. 8 The primary areas of emphasis continue to be bid-
rigging and horizontal price fixing.9
Third, the Department has submitted legislative proposals
which, if enacted, would increase federal enforcement activity in
the criminal antitrust area.' These proposals request, among
other things, treble damages for criminal convictions rather than
the current remedy of actual costs and the mandatory imposition
of jail sentences as opposed to mere fines for corporate officials
found guilty of collusive practices."
15 See M. Crane, D. Foster, C. Hills, R. Pogue, "Interview with J.
Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division," 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 27, 31 (1984); J. Halverson, J. Loftis, H. Reasoner, T.
Briggs, "60 Minutes with Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division," 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 255, 260 (1986); T.
Briggs, "60 Minutes with Charles Rule, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division," 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 261, 264-65 (1987). (Referred to
hereinafter as "60 Minutes with Charles Rule.")
16 Briggs, supra, note 15 at 265.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. Rule notes that the five areas that currently account for the
highest percentage of grand jury investigations are road building, elec-
trical contracting, utility contracting, movie-split cases and moving and
storage.
20 See, e.g., Antitrust Remedies Improvement Act, S. 2162 and
H.R. 4250, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
21 Id.
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On the other hand, the Department has increased its amicus
curiae brief program and now submits briefs regarding civil
antitrust cases to the Supreme Court even when not requested to
do so. In these briefs the Department frequently urges increased
flexibility and deference to neoclassical economics in the Court's
execution of antitrust law. Consequently, the Department since
1981 has supported the defendant in the majority of these
actions.'
The deemphasizing of civil antitrust enforcement has occurred
concomitantly with the "get tough" approach. Efficiency-based
principles underlie the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines2
and Guidelines for Vertical Restraints.2 Moreover, decreased
budget requests, employment cutbacks and a drastic reduction in
the number of civil cases initiated, especially in the area of merger
control, reveal a firm commitment to the laissez-faire approach in
the civil antitrust area. Furthermore, the Department has
proposed extensive legislation designed to reduce antitrust
enforcement in the private arena."' The obvious cause of this
22 For a list of the recent Supreme Court antitrust cases in which the
Department has filed an amicus curiae brief favoring the defendant, see
Campbell, "The Antitrust Record of the First Reagan Administration,"
64 TEx. L. REv. 353 (1985). See also, Cargill and Matsushita, supra,
n. 3.
23 1982 Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg.
28,493, revised, 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed.
Reg. 26,823 (June 29, 1984); reprinted in 2 CCH Trade Reg. 4490; 46
BNA ATRR 1126 (June 14, 1984).
24 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (Feb. 14, 1985); reprinted in CCH Trade Reg.
Rep. #687 Part II (January 30, 1985); 48 BNA ATRR 193 & Special
Suppl. #1199 (January 24, 1985): For a record of the House Judiciary
Committee's response to the Vertical Guidelines proposal, see 48 BNA
ATRR 1006 (June 13, 1985).
25 Merger Modernization Act of 1986, S. 2160 and H.R. 4247, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Interlocking Directorate Act of 1986, S. 2163
and H.R. 4248, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1986, S. 2164 and H.R. 4249, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986); Promoting Competition in Distressed Industries Act, S.
2161 and H.R. 4251, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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noninterventionist approach to civil actions is the administra-
tion's dedication to the efficiency-based antitrust rationale of the
Chicago school.
A perfect illustration of the Antitrust Division's divergent
policies concerning criminal and civil enforcement is the Antitrust
Remedies Improvement Act,1 a bill proposed to Congress by the
Justice Department. In this legislative proposal, the Division
requests the trebling of damages when the United States seeks
antitrust sanctions, but asks for a reduction in damage awards in
civil actions involving private parties.27 Thus, the effect sought is
to increase the deterrent of the legislation for one type of illegal
act while decreasing it for another type of anticompetitive activity
and, more important, to elevate the importance of the govern-
ment's interpretation of the law.
The result of this schizophrenic approach to antitrust execu-
tion is the restriction of the anticompetitive activity of small bid-
riggers and road construction companies (the object of the
majority of criminal actions) which has relatively little impact on
the aggregate competitive nature of the market contrasted with
authorization and even encouragement of major public anticom-
petitive activities which have far-reaching economic effects. Fur-
thermore, the Department's conscious decision not to intervene
to help prosecute activity which arguably violates the Clayton and
Sherman Acts coupled with its prodefendant amicus curiae brief
program raises strong questions as to the constitutional limits of
prosecutorial discretion-can the executive branch refuse to
enforce legislatively adopted provisions simply because it believes
that doing so will cause inefficiency?' The Department's success-
ful amicus filing in Matsushita is representative of the outcome
when ideology overwhelms commitment to law.
26 S. 2162 and H.R. 4250, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
27 Id.
28 Scalia, "The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation," 55 Arri-
TRUST L.R. 191 (1986). (Justice Scalia briefly reviews the history of exec-
utive agency inaction from Marbury v. Madison to the present. He gives
great weight to prosecutorial discretion.)
HeinOnline -- 33 Antitrust Bull. 582 1988
Sherman Act cases : 583
II. The Matsushita decision
Matsushita involved an alleged conspiracy among twenty-one
corporations that manufactured or sold television receivers and
other consumer electronic products." Plaintiffs, two American
television manufacturers, contended that defendants conspired to
suppress competition by fixing high prices for television sets sold
in Japan and using the proceeds to fund a conspiracy in the
United States to charge artificially low prices in order to penetrate
and maintain a significant share of the American market °
Plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated, inter alia, Section
One of the Sherman Act and the Antidumping Act of 1916.1'
29 Defendants were Japanese firms and their Japanese and Ameri-
can subsidiaries. Japanese parent corporations named as defendants
included Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp., Ltd., Mitsubishi Corpo-
ration, Toshiba Corporation, Hitachi Ltd., Sharp Corporation, Sanyo
Electric Company Ltd. and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. In re Japa-
nese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir.
1983). Defendant subsidiaries included Mitsubishi International Corp.,
Matsushita Electronics Corp. of America, Matsushita Electric Corp.,
Matsushita Electric Trading Corp., Quasar Electronics Corp., Toshiba
American Inc., Hitachi Sales Corp. of Japan, Hitachi Sales Corp. of
America, Sharp Electronics Corporation, Sanyo Electric, Inc., Sanyo
Electric Trading Co., Sanyo Electric Manufacturing Co., Sony Corp. of
America, and Melco Sales Inc. 723 F.2d at 251, n. 4. Sony Corporation
and its sales subsidiary, Sony Corporation of America were originally
named as defendants but settled nine years before the litigation reached
the Supreme Court. 723 F.2d at 251, n. 3.
30 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1354-55 (1986).
31 Id. at 1351-1352. The Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72
(1982) generally prohibits "price discrimination between purchasers in
different national markets." J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 4 (1966). The Act's text provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in
importing any articles from any foreign country into the United
States, commonly and systematically to import, sell or cause to
be imported or sold such articles within the United States at a
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In support of their allegations, plaintiffs presented a multi-
tude of evidence at trial, culled from years of discovery.n After
price substantially less than the actual market value or whole-
sale price of such articles, at the time of exportation into the
United States, in the principal markets of country of their
production, or of other foreign countries to which they are
commonly exported after adding to such market value or
wholesale price, freight, duty and other charges or expenses
necessarily incident to the importation and sale thereof in the
United States; Provided, that such acts or acts be done with the
intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States,
or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United
States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade or
commerce in such articles in the United States.
32 Pursuant to the trial court's pretrial order, plaintiffs filed
250,000 documents evidencing the alleged conspiracy. Plaintiffs' docu-
mentation included the following:
(1) various agreements and rules of certain Japanese manufac-
turer's associations relating to export practices;
(2) diaries of officials of several of the Japanese defendants,
alleged to contain evidence of the conspiracies referenced in
plaintiffs' complaint;
(3) export control agreements entered into by Japanese manu-
facturers;
(4) the rules of the Japanese Machinery Exporters Association
(JMEA) which implemented the export control agreements and
included provisions allocating the U.S. market by restricting
each manufacturer to five customers and requiring the registra-
tion of trademarks. The rules also contained the "rationales"
of the agreements, explaining the necessity of stabilizing the
export trade;
(5) the findings of the U.S. government, including the dumping
findings by the Treasury Department and the finding by the
International Trade Commission of injury sustained by U.S.
manufacturers of television receivers;
(6) evidence of similar conduct of defendants in selling con-
sumer electronic products in the U.S. at prices substantially
lower than those at which the same merchandise is sold in
Japan, and at below cost;
(Footnote continued on following page)
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ruling the majority of the evidence inadmissible,33 the trial court
considered the defendants' motion for summary judgment in
light of the newly eviscerated record. The Court found that the
evidence of defendants' joint action raised no genuine issue of
material fact as to the existence of a conspiracy. 5 The trial court
granted summary judgment to defendants.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, in great
part because the appellate court found that much of the evidence
(Footnote continued from previous page)
(7) evidence indicating that the Japanese defendants' U.S.
subsidiaries similarly and consistently operated at a loss, as
reported in their tax returns and financial statements;
(8) the opinion of plaintiffs' experts that defendants consti-
tuted a cartel and engaged in both the home market and export
facets of the alleged conspiracy.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100,
1126-1127 (1981).
33 In three separate opinions, the District Court issued pretrial
orders excluding various categories of evidence. In the first of these, the
court characterized a variety of U.S. and Japanese government docu-
ments as hearsay, irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa.
1980)
The second opinion held inadmissible the diaries of Japanese offi-
cials, internal memoranda of certain defendants and minutes of Japa-
nese export council meetings. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
The final opinion considered the admissibility of testimony from five
of plaintiff's expert witnesses. The experts' testimony took the form of
lengthy reports discussing a range of economic, financial and technolog-
ical issues relating to the alleged conspiracy. The court found that the
experts relied on untrustworthy sources, and that they acted not as econ-
omists, but as "conspiracyologists engaged in inadmissible 'oath-
helping.' " Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F.
Supp. 1100, 1137-1138 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
34 As the district court noted, the evidentiary rulings not only "nar-
rowed markedly the scope of the viable record. . . . but [also] virtually
emasculated plaintiff's case." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
35 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1180-1318 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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excluded at trial was in fact admissible." Reviewing an expanded
record, the court discovered direct evidence of some concerted
action." The presence of direct evidence, the court noted, tended
to demonstrate the existence of an illegal conspiracy "without the
intervention of the proof of any other fact."38 The appellate panel
also found significant circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy."
The cumulative effect of the direct and circumstantial evidence,
the court noted,' would allow a reasonable factfinder to infer an
agreement between defendants to stabilize prices in the Japanese
market, thereby deriving profits from which a conspiracy to fix
low prices in the United States could be funded.4
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Powell, the Supreme
Court reinstated the trial court's judgment. 42 The Court began its
analysis of defendants' summary judgment motion by noting the
general rule that a genuine issue of material fact must exist to
present a case to the jury.43 The Court stated that defendants,
with their own sworn denials, had carried their initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a material dispute, shifting the
burden of presenting a genuine issue for trial to the plaintiffs.4 In
36 In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d
238, 260-303 (3d Cir. 1985).
37 Id. at 304.
38 Id. at 304.
39 Id. at 304-319.
40 Id. at 304-305.
41 Id. at 304-319.
42 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106
S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
43 1d. at 1355-56.
44 Id., defendants cited Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure which provide in pertinent part:
(Footnote continued on following page)
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considering whether plaintiffs had satisfied this requirement, the
court surprisingly held that if the context of plaintiffs' claim
renders the contention economically implausible, regardless of
record evidence, then summary disposition is appropriate.45 The
Court, quoting Monsanto v. Spray Rite Corp.,' further con-
cluded that economic theory suggesting that the alleged concerted
action made no economic sense, undermining the possibility that
a conspiracy existed.47
(Footnote continued from previous page)
When a Motion for Summary Judgment is made and supported
as provided for in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e).
45 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct.
1348-1356 (1986). ". . . . If the claim is one that simply makes no eco-
nomic sense-respondents must come forward with more persuasive evi-
dence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary." 106 S.
Ct. at 1356.
46 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
47 Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1357 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at
764 (1984)). Monsanto involved a manufacturer's termination of a dis-
count distributor after the distributor's competitors had complained to
the manufacturer about the distributor's price cutting. The terminated
discount distributor, Spray Rite, produced evidence at trial that it had
been terminated because of its pricing practices. 465 U.S. at 759, 765.
Monsanto, the manufacturer, contended that it had terminated Spray
Rite not because of its pricing, but because of inadequate sales promo-
tion. Id. at 757. The jury found that Monsanto's actions were taken
pursuant to a conspiracy between Monsanto and the complaining dis-
tributor to set resale prices. Id. at 758. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed in substance, holding that a plaintiff can sur-
vive a motion for a directed verdict if it shows that a manufacturer ter-
minated a price cutting distributor in response to complaints by other
distributors. Spray Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226,
1238-39 (7th Cir. 1982).
(Footnote continued on following page)
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The Court then conducted its own economic analysis of the
conspiracy, ostensibly to demonstrate its implausibility. The
Court surveyed a number of prominent authorities on predatory
pricing schemes and stated that such actions are "rarely tried"
and even more rarely successful.48 Among the reasons suggested
by the Court were the unwillingness of all conspirators to sustain
long-term losses, their inability to allocate any long-term gains,
and the intended victim's ability to sell at the real market price
should there be too few goods to satisfy market demand.4 9
Applying the latter principle to the historical facts of the
alleged conspiracy, the court then noted that "two decades after
the conspiracy is alleged to have been commenced, [defendants]
appear far from achieving the goal. The two largest shares of the
[American] market are held by RCA and Zenith, and not by any
of the defendants." ' Further, the court noted that the sustained
below cost pricing by the alleged conspirators caused them
(Footnote continued from previous page)
The Supreme Court affirmed, but rejected the Seventh Circuit's
statement concerning the standard of proof required to submit a case to
the jury in conspiracy cases. 465 U.S. at 759, 764. In its stead, the Court
promulgated the more general rule that a plaintiff must present evidence
that "tends to exclude the possibility of independent action." Id. at 764.
Under this standard, a plaintiff must show "direct or circumstantial evi-
dence that reasonably tend to prove that the manufacturers and others
had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve
an unlawful objective." Id. at 764. The Court found that the communi-
cations between Monsanto and its distributors, coupled with a newslet-
ter outlining a price maintenance scheme among distributors created a
cognizable inference of conspiracy. Id. at 765-68.
For extensive discussion concerning the propriety of the Monsanto
rule, see generally Hay, "Vertical Restraints After Monsanto," 70 CoR-
NELL L. Rav. 418-445 (1985); Floyd, "Vertical Antitrust Conspiracies
After Monsanto and Russell Stover," U. KAN. L. REV. 269-304 (1985);
Calvani and Berg, "Resale Price Maintenance After Monsanto; A Doc-
trine Still at War With Itself," 84 DuY.E L.J. 1163-1204 (1984).
48 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357-58 (1986).
49 Id. at 1358.
50 Id.
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to accrue significant losses.' To recover these losses, the court
stated, the cartel would have to remain in force for several years
after the hoped for extinguishment of the competition.'
Additionally, the court stated that the great uncertainty that
would accompany a conspiracy under these circumstances elimi-
nated any possible motive that the conspirators could have.53
Further, the court found that defendants, as presumably rational
business persons, had every incentive not to engage in the conduct
with which they were charged. The Court chastised the appellate
panel for ignoring the lack of motive and for focusing instead on
the existence of supposed direct evidence of concert of action.-
This misplaced focus, the court noted, led the Third Circuit to its
erroneous conclusion that a material fact question remained
concerning the existence of a conspiracy. The court then cited
First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Corp." for the proposition that
lack of motive bears on the range of permissible conclusions that
might be drawn from ambiguous evidence."6 If defendants had no
rational motive to conspire, the court concluded, then the con-
duct "does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy."" Accord-
ingly, the Court reinstated the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for defendants.
51 Id. at 1359.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1360-1361.
54 Id. at 1361. According to the Court, the "direct evidence" on
which the appellate court relied was evidence of other combinations, not
of a predatory pricing conspiracy. The Court stated that the "direct evi-
dence" pointed only to a conspiracy in Japan to raise prices. This con-
spiracy to raise profits in one market, the Court noted, did not evidence
a conspiracy to sustain losses in another. 106 S. Ct. at 1361.
55 391 U.S. 253 (1967).
56 Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1361.
57 Id.
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The Supreme Court's affirmance of the lower court's sum-
mary judgment order evidences a misapplication of existing
conspiracy and summary judgment law. By requiring conspiracy
plaintiffs to demonstrate the economic plausibility of the substan-
tive goal of an alleged conspiracy, the Court has created a
significant new barrier to plaintiffs seeking jury review; the fact
that it may be irrational in theory for a particular seller to engage
in long-term predatory pricing cannot contradict the record
evidence that numerous sellers, in fact, have engaged in such
conduct. Evidence of such consciously parallel "irrational"
below-cost selling by multiple sellers constitutes positive evidence
of a conspiracy, moreover, because such conduct is contrary to
the economic self-interest of each defendant, were it acting
unilaterally, as will be discussed below. In any event, Matsushita
plaintiffs apparently must argue the merits of a designated set of
economic theorems: in particular, they must rely on economic
assumptions acceptable to laissez-faire economists." In so hold-
ing, the Court has deprived the factfinder of the opportunity to
weigh competing inferences to be drawn from each party's
experts. Moreover, the Court has repudiated generations of case
law addressing summary judgment standards in antitrust cases.
III. Traditional standards for granting summary judgment
and their application to Matsushita
As the Matsushita court itself notes, Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure permits the grant of summary judg-
ment if the documents on file "show there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to relief
58 The Court referred to the writings of several economists in hold-
ing that the alleged conspiracy was economically implausible. Among
those cited were former professors, now Judges Bork, Easterbrook and
Posner. 106 S. Ct. at 1357-58.
It is not contended that an evaluation of evidence based on these
sources is inappropriate. Rather, it is argued that the Court's failure to
relay information gleaned from these sources to a jury is contrary to the
settled rule that competing theories are to be submitted to a jury.
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as a matter of law.'" 9 Further, summary judgment should not be
granted if there is the "slightest doubt" about material facts;6 the
burden of demonstrating the absence of a material factual dispute
rests on the moving party." Finally, summary judgment is gener-
ally not appropriate if the resolution of a material issue of fact
turns on the credibility of witnesses. 2
While briefly referencing these settled rules, the Court did not
discuss Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 63 the semi-
nal decision involving antitrust summary judgment. In Poller, the
Court noted that "summary procedures should be used sparingly
in complex antitrust cases where motive and intent play leading
roles and the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspira-
tors. '"61 Poller has never been overruled, requiring courts to pay
heed to its commands. 5 Moreover, in Norfolk Monument Co.
59 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Louis, "Federal Summary Judgment
Doctrine: A Critical Analysis," 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974); Asbill & Snell,
"Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules-When an Issue of Fact
Is Presented," 51 MICH. L. REv. 1143 (1953); Bauman, "A Rationale of
Summary Judgment," 33 IND. L.J. 467 (1958).
60 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
61 See, e.g., Tomalewski v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 882,
884 (3d Cir. 1974); Devet Corp. v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 382 F.2d 17,
21 (7th Cir. 1967); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus.
Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
62 See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S.
464, 473 (1962); Remak v. Quinn, 611 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1979).
63 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
64 Id. at 473. Moreover, federal courts are generally reluctant to
grant summary judgment where motive and intent are at issue. See
Cross v. United States, 336 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1964); Bragen v. Hudson
County News Co., 278 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1962).
65 As the district court in Matsushita noted, however, an argument
can be made that the Poller standard has been dulled in recent years. See
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp.
1100, 1140-1142 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The Poller rule has been criticized as
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Inc. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens,6 the Court reaffirmed its
caution in granting summary judgment in conspiracy cases. In
Norfolk, the Court stated that summary disposition is inappro-
priate when an alleged conspiracy has not been conclusively
disproved by pretrial discovery. 6 This language suggests that the
summary judgment movant still shoulders a heavy burden, and
that a movant must conclusively rebut all of a plaintiff's infer-
ences suggesting a conspiracy. 6
The Matsushita court ignored the Poller and Norfolk Monu-
ment decisions, focusing instead on First National Bank of
Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 9 a case decided after Poller, but
before Norfolk Monument. In Cities, the Court affirmed a grant
of summary judgment on a conspiracy claim. The Cities court did
not, however, purport to overrule Poller, nor did the Cities panel
attempt to modify the Poller language. Rather, the Cities court
distinguished Poller by examining what it considered to be the
basic question in each case-the motive behind the respective
defendant's failure to do business with plaintiffs. 0 In Poller, the
"an unwarranted gloss on the genuine issue requirement." Report of
the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Proce-
dures, reprinted in 80 F.R.D. 509, 566-67 (1979). Moreover, numerous
courts have granted or upheld the grant of summary judgment since the
Poller case in 1962. See, e.g., Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287, 291 (2d
Cir. 1972); Dressler v. MV Sandpiper, 331 F.2d 130, 132-34 (2d Cir.
1964); Midwest Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d
573 (3d Cir. 1979).
Despite the frequency with which lower courts have granted sum-
mary judgment in antitrust conspiracy cases, the Supreme Court effec-
tively adhered to the Poller standard before the Monsanto and
Matsushita decisions. See Norfolk Monument Co., Inc. v. Woodlawn
Memorial Gardens, 394 U.S. 700 (1969).
6 394 U.S. 700 (1969).
67 Id. at 704.
68 See Rogers, "Summary Judgment in Antitrust Conspiracy Liti-
gation," 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 667 (1979).
69 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
70 Id. at 285.
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Cities court noted, plaintiffs and defendants were competitors,
permitting the plaintiff to plausibly argue that defendants had a
motive to conspire to drive him out of business. By contrast, the
parties in Cities had no competitive relationship and had motives
to act unilaterally in a parallel fashion, rendering plaintiff's
conspiracy allegations highly speculative."' Consequently, the Cit-
ies panel granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Matsushita's reliance on Cities was thus misplaced. The Cities
defendant had no demonstrable motive to conspire. Conversely,
in Matsushita the parties were competitors, giving defendants a
joint reason to combine with others to drive plaintiff from the
market. Accordingly, the Matsushita court should have applied
the Poller/Norfolk analysis, the standard that remains the rule
for cases involving an alleged conspiracy against a potential
competitor.'
71 Id. at 285-86.
72 Two Supreme Court cases since Norfolk have affirmed Poller's
rigorous summary judgment standards, albeit in divergent contexts. See
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Hospital Bldg. Co.
v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976).
Commentators have, however, suggested that Cities constitutes a
slight retreat from the Poller standard of conclusively rebutting a plain-
tiff's inference of conspiracy on a summary judgment motion. These
observers note that the existence of a conspiracy in Cities could have
been inferred from the evidence. Consequently, it can be argued that the
Cities grant of summary judgment relieves a movant of the Poller bur-
den. See Note, "First National Bank v. Cities Service Co.," 10 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 196, 204 (1968); Rogers, "Summary Judgment in
Antitrust Conspiracy Litigation," 10 Loy. U.L. REv. 667 (1979).
Nevertheless, as noted, the Court in Norfolk Monument Co., Inc. v.
Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, which followed Cities, reaffirmed the
Poller standard. Moreover, the Matsushita court misapplied the Cities
rationale. While the Cities defendant may not have disproved all of
plaintiff's inferences, the Matsushita defendants disproved none of
plaintiffs' theories. Instead, the Court merely accepted defendant's bold
assertions that the alleged conspiracy was economically implausible.
Rather than permit a jury to weigh the contradictory testimony of each
party's experts, the Court selected the theories to be applied.
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Additionally, the Matsushita decision inexplicably applied the
already questionable doctrine announced in Monsanto" concern-
ing the quantum of evidence required to survive a summary
judgment motion in a vertical price fixing conspiracy context. In
Monsanto, the Court held that a manufacturer's termination of
a price cutting distributor in response to a complaint from a
nonterminated distributor is not enough, standing alone, to
create a jury question.' From these facts, the Monsanto panel
announced that a plaintiff alleging anticompetitive concert of
action must present evidence "tending to exclude the possibility"
that the alleged conspirators were acting independently in order
to survive a motion for summary judgment."
While creating a new burden for plaintiffs alleging a vertical
conspiracy, the Monsanto decision is inapplicable to horizontal
price fixing cases like Matsushita. The Monsanto opinion con-
tains no expressed or implied language concerning the kind or
quantity of evidence required to withstand defendant's motion
for summary judgment76 in a horizontal context. Rather, as the
Matsushita dissenters suggest, Monsanto simply held that presen-
tation of a particular type of evidence in a dealer/distributor
conspiracy situation is not enough to send a case to a jury."
73 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
74 Id.
75 See note 47 and accompanying text. The Court did not address
the conflict between its new standard and the "preponderance of the
evidence" test traditionally used in civil cases.
76 The Monsanto Court discussed the issue only in terms of vertical
conspiracies. In fact, the Court granted certiorari for the express pur-
pose of resolving a conflict among the circuits concerning the evidence
that an antitrust plaintiff must present to survive a directed verdict in a
manufacturer-distributor context. 465 U.S. at 759. Moreover, each case
cited by the Monsanto Court as creating the conflict dealt with dealer
terminations. Id. at 759, n. 5.
77 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct.
1348, 1363 (1986).
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Finally, as a peripheral matter, the Matsushita Court summar-
ily dispensed with plaintiff's price fixing evidence, yet did not
review plaintiffs claim under the Antidumping Act of 1916.7' The
appellate court had, however, examined the dumping issue and
concluded that sufficient evidence of dumping existed to preclude
summary judgment." More importantly, the appellate panel con-
cluded that evidence supporting plaintiff's dumping claims also
created a fact question concerning defendant's alleged price
fixing conspiracy.0 Despite the lower court's explicit affirmation
of plaintiff's conspiracy theory using plaintiff's dumping evi-
dence, the Supreme Court allowed the appellate ruling on the
dumping issue to stand.81 The Court's inaction suggests the
paradoxical conclusion that defendant's alleged conspiracy was
economically implausible if labeled price fixing, but commercially
sensible and thus cognizable if labeled dumping.
IV. The development of the traditional evidentiary
standard for criminal conspiracies
Precedent relating to conspiracy law, generally, and antitrust
conspiracy law, specifically, does not support the Supreme
Court's creation of an exceptional evidentiary standard for civil
antitrust cases. A brief review of the developments of the
Supreme Court's evidentiary standards in general criminal con-
spiracy cases and antitrust conspiracy cases will reveal this fact.
One of the most powerful tools used in prosecution of
conspiracy cases has been the use of jury inferences in the absence
78 The Court declined to review plaintiff's dumping claim because
the allegations were not mentioned in the questions presented segment
of defendant's writ of certiorari, nor were they independently argued by
the parties. 106 S. Ct. at 1352, n. 3.
79 In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d
319 (3d Cir. 1983).
80 723 F.2d at 328.
81 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct.
1348, 1352, n. 3.
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of direct evidence. In Glasser v. United States," the Court for the
first time discussed the use of jury inferences to find the existence
of a conspiratorial agreement. The Court found that "[p]articipa-
tion in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence; a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a
development and collection of circumstances.'"'I Repeatedly, the
lower courts have affirmed this principle.' The rationale behind
such a rule is sound. Conspiracy is by its nature a clandestine
activity; it is not necessary for the parties to have direct contact
with one another or communicate verbally their intention to
agree.85 It is, therefore, unlikely that the aggrieved party can
prove existence by use of direct evidence, and thus the jury must
be allowed to infer such existence." For these reasons, circum-
stantial evidence plays a key role in conspiracy cases because of
its relevance.
In Holland v. United States,8 the Court reinforced its position
that circumstantial evidence may be relied upon as the basis for
finding the existence of criminality. The Court specifically
rejected the rule that where the proponent's evidence is circum-
stantial, it must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
82 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the
United States).
83 Id. at 80.
84 See United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985) (par-
ticipation in a conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence, but
may be inferred from actions of the accused or by circumstantial evi-
dence of a scheme); United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.
1984); United States v. Caudle, 758 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Paradis, 802 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Trout-
man, 814 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Tortillo, 759 F.2d
998 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Cardano-Alvarado, 806 F.2d 269
(5th Cir. 1986).
85 P. Marcus, "Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory
and in Practice," 65 GEORGETOWN L. JOUR. 951-52 (1977).
86 Id.
87 348 U.S. 121 (1954). (Defendants were convicted of wilfully
attempting to defraud the federal government and evade income taxes.)
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other than guilt.88 It reasoned that circumstantial and testimonial
evidence are intrinsically the same in the sense that in some cases
each may point to the incorrect result.Y But when either type of
evidence is used the court can require no more than that the fact-
finder weigh the probabilities and convince itself beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.10
Modem conspiracy cases adopt the rule in Holland.9' To
determine the existence of a conspiracy a jury must weigh the
probabilities that the defendant's actions were independent
against the probabilities that defendant's acts were interdepen-
dent. The plaintiffs are not required to offer proof that rejects
every reasonable hypothesis that a conspiracy does not exist.
The evidentiary standards of conspiracy that grew out of both
§ 1 and § 2 actions of the Sherman Act acquiesced with the
general principles set forth in Glasser and Holland. In Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States,9 the Supreme Court implicitly
acknowledged that in antitrust conspiracy cases, a court should
permit a broad latitude of inferences based on circumstantial
evidence. Then in American Tobacco Co. v. United States,9" the
Court more fully explored the role of circumstantial evidence in
proving conspiracy in Sherman Act cases. The Court stated:
No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful
conspiracy . . . . The essential combination or conspiracy in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealings or
other circumstances as well as in the exchange of words. Where the
88 Id. at 139-40.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 140.
91 See United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980 (1987); United States v.
Rodriguez, 808 F.2d 1284 (1985); United States v. Shehane, 517 F.2d
1113, 1127 (8th Cir. 1974) (it is not necessary that the evidence exclude
every reasonable hypothesis, but simply that the jury is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt).
306 U.S. 208 (1939).
93 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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circumstances are such as to warrant a jury finding that the conspira-
tors had unity of purpose or a common design and understanding or
a meeting of minds in Wull'awful arrangement, the conclusion that a
conspiracy is established is justified.'
Thus, in American Tobacco the Court recognized the necessity of
circumstantial evidence in antitrust conspiracy actions as it had
done in general conspiracy cases in Glasser a few years earlier.
The American Tobacco decision, in dicta, implicitly outlined
a rough test to determine the validity of a jury inference of an
unlawful agreement in a Sherman Act case. First, the Court
identified consciously parallel conduct on the part of all the
individual defendants.-5 Second, the Court emphasized that sev-
eral of these parallel acts had no economic justification for the
defendants. For example, the Court found that although the cost
of tobacco to each tobacco distributor was at its lowest level in 25
years, one of the defendants raised the price of its leading
cigarette brand. The same day, two of the other defendants also
raised the price of their primary brands. The Court went on to list
several other economically unexplainable acts committed by the
defendants.9 Although the officials of the defendant companies
gave several alternative reasons for the move, the Court impliedly
accepted the jury's inference of conspiracy.
One commentator refers to the American Tobacco test as the
"plus-factors approach" in that it demands proof of conscious
94 Id. at 809-10.
95 Id. at 798-808. The Court outlined the structure of the concerted
oligopoly that had formed after the breakup of the American Tobacco
Trust in 1911. This summary included analysis of parallel activity in the
purchase as well as the distribution and sale of tobacco between nine of
the largest tobacco companies in the industry. The Court's analysis con-
centrated on the top three companies: American Tobacco, Liggett and
Reynolds. Parallel purchasing and parallel distribution and sales activi-
ties were the main actions highlighted to illustrate the parallel conduct.
6 Id. at 800-01 (purchasing), 804-07 (distribution and sale).
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parallel activity plus something more.97 That "something more"
is usually proof of conduct contrary to the company's economic
self-interest or proof of economic motivation to collude. In
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,91 the Court affirmed a
jury inference of conspiracy based on parallel activity and cir-
cumstantial proof of activity which was not in the best economic
interest of the defendants. The record revealed that several movie
distributors entered into agreements setting the minimum price of
first run movies. Then, the defendants based their decision as to
whether to sell to exhibitors (moviehouses) not on the basis of
competitive factors such as appointments, size, or location but
rather upon whether the exhibitor was party to the minimum
price agreement.'
In 1954, Theatre Enterprise, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distr.
Corp., ° the Court reemphasized the need to prove not only
conscious parallelism in antitrust conspiracy cases but to also
show added factors. The Court stated that while circumstantial
evidence of consciously parallel behavior has made heavy inroads
into traditional attitudes toward conspiracy, "conscious parallel-
ism has not read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.'I If
one carefully reads the dicta in American Tobacco, the Theatre
Enterprise warning appears to be a reaffirmation that additional
factors that point towards collusion must exist to allow a reason-
able jury inference of conspiracy.
97 Marks, "Can Conspiracy Theory Solve the 'Oligopoly
Problem,' " 45 MARY. L. REV. 387, 404 (1986) (comparing the judicial
method of proving conspiracy in an oligopoly setting and various other
methods such as Judge Posner's approach); see also SCHWARTZ, FLYNN,
AND FIRST, ANTITRUST 447 (6th ed. 1983).
98 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
99 Id. at 146.
100 346 U.S. 537.
101 Id. at 540-46.
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Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
added yet another guideline for the proper evidentiary standards
in antitrust conspiracy cases. It warned against fragmenting or
compartmentalizing the evidence in an antitrust conspiracy
case."I In order for legitimate inferences about the ultimate facts
at issue to be drawn, all of the admissible evidence, direct and
circumstantial must be examined."°
The recognition that a criminal prosecutor should not be
required to introduce evidence excluding all hypotheses of inno-
cence is of relatively recent origin. Representative of contrary
early cases is Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States.10 In that case,
two dairy companies allegedly conspired to fix milk prices. The
Eighth Circuit there held that a government prosecutor relying on
circumstantial evidence must not only prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but must also show that "all facts are inconsis-
tent with any other rational conclusion than that of guilt of the
defendants. "1
102 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
103 Id. at 699.
104 Id. Thus, the Court's approach is not only inconsistent with the
standard in criminal antitrust actions, but is also at odds with its
approach in other types of litigation. In employment discrimination
cases, for example, the Court has held that a jury inference of discrimi-
nation under Title VII is established by proof that a plaintiff is qualified
for the position, that the plaintiff was rejected, and that the employer
continues to seek applicants with like credentials. See, e.g., Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 and n.
6 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Such evidence does not exclude the possibility that an employer rejected
the applicant for nondiscriminatory reasons. Nevertheless, the Court
has held that this evidence is not only sufficient for a jury inference of
discrimination, but also that it compels the inference unless the defen-
dant presents a nondiscrimnatory motive for its action. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254-56 and nn. 7-8.
105 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949).
106 Id. at 367.
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Current case law, by contrast, as noted above, rejects the
hypothesis of innocence test in favor of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard. In United States v. Moya, the Seventh Circuit
identified the reasonable doubt test as the sole standard for
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases.'" In
reaching this conclusion, the Court drew a clear distinction
between the two standards. The reasonable doubt test, the Court
noted, requires a reviewing court to examine whether a factfinder
confronted with conflicting hypotheses considered the evidence
according to the prosecution's inferences.' °9 The hypothesis of
innocence test, by contrast, requires an appellate court to decide
whether a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the evidence
is inconsistent with the defendant's hypothesis." 0
Further, the Fourth Circuit recently affirmed the reasonable
doubt standard in a criminal antitrust conspiracy case. In United
States v. W.. F. Brinkley & Sons Const. Co.," the Court upheld
jury instructions requiring the prosecution to demonstrate that no
reasonable doubt existed concerning the defendants' participation
in a bid-rigging arrangement. Despite the presence of plausible
evidence indicating that the defendants might have acted unilater-
107 721 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Moore v. Boating Indus.
Assoc., 754 F.2d 698, 712 at n. 22 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Weed, 689 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, __ U.S. ., 103 S. Ct.
2398 (1983); compare Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 ("court
should determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"). See
generally "United States v. Bell and the Directed Verdict in Criminal
Cases: The Death of the Two Hypotheses Rule," 35 MERCER L. REv.
1209-1226 (1984).
108 United States v. Moya, 721 F.2d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 1983).
109 Id.
110 Id.
M 783 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1986).
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ally,"2 the Court affirmed the appellant's conviction. That the
Court upheld the reasonable doubt standard under these circum-
stances evidences a firm resistance to a return to a hypothesis of
innocence standard in criminal antitrust actions.
It is therefore apparent that civil antitrust plaintiffs and
criminal prosecutors face distinct tasks in bringing antitrust suits;
the criminal complainant clearly shoulders a lesser burden. In the
event that the new Matsushita rule is adopted for criminal
antitrust suits, however, the prosecutor's job would be made
significantly more difficult. Adherence to the Matsushita stan-
dard in criminal cases would mandate an effective return to the
hypothesis of innocence test for criminal defendants which, as
noted, the courts have explicitly rejected. Under this standard, a
criminal defendant would be entitled to a verdict merely by
creating an alternative hypothesis for his conduct.
Conversely, if the Matsushita standard is not applied to
criminal antitrust cases, then an anomalous gap in standards of
proof between civil and criminal antitrust cases obtains. The
Matsushita requirement that a plaintiff present evidence tending
to exclude the possibility of a conspiracy creates a nearly insur-
mountable barrier to jury review for civil complainants. By
contrast, a criminal prosecutor can prove his case using a reason-
able doubt standard. Thus, it becomes more difficult for a civil
plaintiff to reach a jury than for a prosecutor to persuade a jury.
Moreover, if Matsushita is confied to civil cases, reasonable
observers could suggest that ideology plays a role in the Supreme
Court's decision making process. Imposing a stiffer burden on
the civil antitrust plaintiffs in Matsushita than on criminal prose-
112 In Brinkley, two contractors serving as immunized witnesses for
the prosecution testified that they had been unable to obtain certain cost
data necessary to submit a competitive bid on a construction project.
Rather than anger employees who had worked hard to put the rest of
the bid package together, the contractors decided to submit a noncom-
petitive bid. Subsequently, they contacted defendant, who supplied
them with a "safe" amount to bid. The Court rejected defendant's con-
tention that the contractors' action constituted unilateral behavior
because they decided to submit a noncompetitive bid prior to their dis-
cussions with defendant. 783 F.2d at 1159.
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cutors gives rise to the inference that this Court prefers the
Justice Department over so-called private attorneys general. If
this is true, the only consistency in antitrust cases will be that civil
defendants will virtually always prevail unless also facing a
criminal indictment.
V. The appropriateness of economic analysis and logic in
adjudicating Sherman Act conspiracy allegations
The Matsushita Court's pronouncements were effectively
made by a panel examining a summary judgment record bereft of
direct evidence of conspiracy. While the appellate court found
plaintiffs' evidence probative of a conspiracy to fix minimum
prices, the Supreme Court characterized the same evidence as
irrelevant."' Plaintiffs had not, according to the Court, presented
direct evidence of a predatory pricing scheme. Rather, plaintiffs
had produced facts evidencing collateral conspiracies permitted
under United States law. 14
Despite its disagreement with the Court of Appeals concern-
ing the existence of direct evidence of a minimum price-fixing
conspiracy, the Court could have profitably, examined defen-
dant's behavior by employing elements of traditional "conscious
parallelism" doctrine. This doctrine is often applied where no
direct evidence of conspiracy exists."5 An analysis of plaintiffs'
113 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct.
1348, 1361 (1986).
114 The Court stated that the "direct evidence" on which the Court
of Appeals relied was merely evidence of a conspiracy to fix high prices
in Japan. This conspiracy, the Court noted, did not support plaintiff's
allegation of a domestic price fixing conspiracy, since "a conspiracy to
increase profits in one market does not tend to show a conspiracy to sus-
tain losses in another." 106 S. Ct. at 1361. The Court also characterized
evidence that defendants had agreed to a horizontal territorial allocation
as irrelevant, since "the natural effect would be to raise market prices
rather than reduce them." Id.
115 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208(1939); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977). See
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evidence under the conscious parallelism principle necessitates,
however, a brief review of its requirements.
A. Conscious parallelism as circumstantial evidence
of conspiracy
Conscious parallelism generally refers to the common prac-
tice among firms in a concentrated industry of conducting their
business in a uniform manner, aware that their counterparts are
pursuing the same course of action."6 Proof of conscious paral-
lelism does not, however, constitute concerted action in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. Instead, courts have required
additional evidence of conspiracy ("plus factors") to find anti-
trust liability." 7 The most frequently employed plus factor is
proof that the parallel behavior was contrary to each firm's eco-
nomic self interest. "'
Courts have, however, differed concerning the precise mean-
ing of "against economic self interest."" 9 Literal application of
generally Turner, "The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal," 75 HARV. L. REv.
655 (1962).
116 Note, "Conscious Parallelism and the Sherman Act: An Analysis
and a Proposal," 30 VAND. L. REv. 1227, 1228 (1977). See also Blech-
man, "Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The
Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws," 24 N.Y.L. ScH.
L. REv. 881 (1979). For economic analyses of conscious parallelism, see
P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, chs. 2-4, 20-26 (9th ed. 1973) and R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVE (1976).
117 "Plus factors are independent items of evidence that, when coup-
led with evidence of conscious parallelism, tend to support a finding of
collusive agreement." Montana v. Super America, 557 F. Supp. 298,
302 (D. Mont. 1983).
118 Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 1977)
(quoting Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prod. Co., 521 F.2d
1309, 1314 (3d Cir. 1975)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
119 See, e.g., Amey v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486,
1503 (11th Cir. 1985); Pan Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632
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the test is technically impossible, since a rational profit maxi-
mizing firm will always act in its perceived self-interest."z Fur-
ther, a firm can maximize profits by entering into a price fixing
agreement; an antitrust defendant could therefore always rebut
a conscious parallelism allegation by arguing that any means of
increasing prices, including a conspiracy to fix prices, would
also advance the firm's interest by increasing profits., Appar-
ently, recognizing these theoretical barriers, some circuits have
modified the original economic self-interest test. These courts
permit an inference of conspiracy when "the pattern of action
undertaken is inconsistent with the self-interest of the individual
actors, were they acting alone."' 22 This rule parallels cartel
theory which suggests that group stabilization of prices and
reduced output enables the participants to achieve a higher mar-
ket price than would be possible if competitive conditions were
present. "
Finally, in Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Products
Co., u the Third Circuit announced that a second prong should
be added to the against economic self-interest test for evaluating
ambiguous evidence of conspiracy. The Court held that an anti-
trust plaintiff must not only demonstrate acts in contradiction
F.2d 539, 359 (5th Cir. 1980);'Milgram v. Loew's Inc., 192 F.2d 579,
583 (3d Cir. 1951); Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 661 (9th Cir. 1961).
120 Mansfield, Microeconomics, 141-47 (3d ed. 1979).
121 Note, "Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the
Boundary," 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 508, 521-22 (1985).
122 Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 327
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982); Admiral Theatre Corp. v.
Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978); Modern Home
Inst. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 513 F.2d 102, 111 (2d
Cir. 1975).
123 R. Posner & F. Easterbrook, Antitrust: Cases, Economic Notes,
and Other Materials, 1064, 1065 (cited in Note, "Conscious Parallelism
and Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary," 52 U. CH. L. REv. 508, 521-
22 (1985).
124 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir. 1975).
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of economic self-interest, but must also present a legitimate
motivation for defendants to enter into an agreement.,' The
addition of the motive requirement was necessary in the Court's
view because in the absence of a demonstration of how it would
benefit a party to conspire, the requisite inference of conspiracy
does not follow from mere coincidence of conduct.'
B. Application of conscious parallelism principles to
Matsushita: the against economic self-interest test
As noted, some courts permit an inference of conspiracy
when the alleged conspirator's behavior is contrary to their eco-
nomic self interest." Accepting the premise that that test con-
travenes elementary economic theory when applied in a
minimum price-fixing contest," the appropriate standard
becomes the related concept requiring a showing that defen-
dants' acts would be inconsistent with their self interest were
they acting alone.129 Before turning to the applicability of these
principles to Matsushita, however, it is necessary to identify the
evidence described by the Matsushita Court as mere inferential
proof. 130
125 Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prod. Co., 521 F.2d at
1314 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 287
(1968), and Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco
Co., 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962)).
126 Venzie, 521 F.2d at 1315; First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co.,
391 U.S. 253, 282 (1968). See, Note, "Conscious Parallelism: The Busi-
ness Judgment Defense in a Summary Judgment Context," 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 115 (1983).
127 See notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
128 Id.
129 See notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
130 As the four dissenters note, the Court of Appeals treated much
of plaintiff's proof as direct evidence of conspiracy, consequently, the
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First, the Court noted the appellate court's finding that
defendants had, by formal agreements with the Japanese Minis-
try of International Trade and Industry (MITI) fixed minimum
prices for consumer electronic products, prices that produced
substantial losses for defendants."' Second, the Court acknowl-
edged the possible existence of the Japanese manufacturer's
"Five Company" rule, whereby each manufacturer agreed to
sell to only five American distributors., Lastly, the Court
addressed the Court of Appeals' finding that a reasonable fact-
finder could conclude that each defendant undercut its own
minimum prices by secretly offering rebate schemes to its
respective customers.' Evaluating each action, it is apparent
that all would be inconsistent with the economic self-interest of
any defendant acting independently. A profit maximizing
businessperson would not sustain substantial losses by maintain-
case "could be distinguished from traditional conscious parallelism situ-
ations in that direct evidence of a price fixing conspiracy existed." Mat-
sushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348,
1364-65 (1986) (White, J. dissenting) (citing in re Japanese Electronics
Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 304-305 (3d Cir. 1983).
The majority treated plaintiff's proof as, at best, indirect evidence of
concerted action. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. Given
the existence of even this arguably ambiguous evidence of a conspiracy,
the Matsushita Court erred in failing to explicitly apply conscious paral-
lelism principles. Had it done so, the Court could have clarified the ver-
sion of the against economic self-interest test to be applied when only
parallel activity is present.
131 Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1353.
132 Id.
133 Id. The Court also noted that the appellate court permitted sev-
eral additional inferences. According to the Court of Appeals, a reason-
able factfinder could conclude that the Japanese market was
characterized by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of pro-
ducers exchanging information on pricing and non-pricing practices.
Further, the appellate panel permitted the inference that Japanese plant
capacity exceeded the needs of the Japanese market, and that the Japa-
nese defendants had relatively higher fixed costs than their American
counterparts, requiring that the plants operate at full capacity in order
to maintain a profit. Id.
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ing below market pricing,'- nor would she limit her activity in a
nationwide market to five customers.' 35 Most obviously, secret
rebates would be unnecessary and illogical in the absence of
concerted action. Accordingly, the Court could have found an
inference of conspiracy under this version of the against eco-
nomic self interest test.
C. Application of the motive test in Matsushita
While omitting a discussion of the against economic self
interest standard, the Matsushita Court did employ a motive
analysis.'3 The Court did not, however, properly apply the
motive test. As noted, the appropriate motive inquiry concerns
the extent to which defendants would generally benefit from the
alleged conspiracy. Rather than resolve this question, the Court
improperly confined its discussion to economic theorizing,1
resulting in its erroneous conclusion that the plaintiff had not
presented enough evidence to avoid summary judgment. This
distortion of the motive requirement, as noted below, contra-
13 It is noteworthy that the Matsushita majority itself affirmed that
as presumably rational businesspersons, the defendants had every incen-
tive to engage in the conduct with which they were charged, for its likely
effect would be to generate losses for the petitioner with no correspond-
ing gains. 106 S. Ct. at 1348.
135 As the Matsushita majority notes, the Court of Appeals found
that defendants created plant capacity which exceeded that which could
be absorbed by the Japanese home market for consumer electronic
products. Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1348 (citing In re Japanese Electron-
ics Litigation, 723 F.2d at 238, 307 (3d Cir. 1983)). Consequently,
according to the appellate court, a factfinder could reasonably infer
from the existence of such excess capacity that those manufacturers had
strong incentives to dispose of the excess capacity in foreign markets.
Id. Moreover, since unlimited price competition in outside markets
characterized by excess capacity would be likely to cause losses, it is rea-
sonable to infer that competitors would collude to fix prices. In re Japa-
nese Electronics Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 307 (3d Cir. 1983).
136 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct.
1345, 1356-66 (1986).
137 Id.
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venes the Court's earlier pronouncement in Cities Services v.
First National Bank of Arizona."' Paradoxically, the Court
repeatedly cited Cities as its sole authority for its instructions
that inferences of conspiracy must be supported by a subjective
demonstration of the conspiracy's economic legitimacy.
In Cities, the plaintiff alleged that seven oil companies had
engaged in a concerted refusal to purchase his oil.'39 The con-
spiracy allegedly began after the Iranian government national-
ized numerous properties of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company.'1°
Following the expropriation, plaintiffs purchased oil from the
company formed by the Iranian government to take over Anglo
Iranians' properties. Subsequently, six of the defendants agreed
to boycott plaintiff's oil. Cities Service Company, following
protracted negotiation with the plaintiff, allegedly joined the
conspiracy after receiving a Kuwaiti bribe.14' In affirming the
trial court's grant of summary judgment,4 1 the Court concluded
that plaintiff had not raised a sufficient inference of conspiracy
to warrant jury review. The Court found that the defendant's
motives in refusing to deal with plaintiff arose not from any
bribe, but from the exercise of business judgment.14 3
An inquiry into the type of business decision making the
Court cited as justifying summary judgment is instructive. After
nationalizing Anglo Iranian, the Iranian government publicly
announced its intention to bring lawsuits against any purchaser
of Iranian oil.'" Additionally, the other oil company defen-
138 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
139 Id. at 259-61.
140 Id. at 260.
141 Id. The alleged bribe consisted of a substantial supply of oil from
Kuwait at a price lower than that offered by the plaintiff.
142 Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 38 F.R.D. 170 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
143 First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S.
253, 286-88 (1968).
14 Id.
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dants, as apparent consequences of their fear of nationalization
by the governments of countries in which they possessed sub-
stantial holdings, relayed to Cities their intention to discontinue
dealings with any company that bought Iranian oil.45 Conse-
quently, the Court concluded, Cities' failure to purchase plain-
tiff's oil resulted not from conspiratorial behavior, but from a
sensible reaction to business realities.
46
Lower courts relying on Cities Services have similarly char-
acterized the motive requirement for summary judgment mov-
ants as involving the exercise of independent business decision
making. In Solinger v. A. & M. Records, Inc.,'47 plaintiff record
distributors alleged a territorial allocation conspiracy between
defendants, with the defendant record producers allegedly con-
spiring to put the plaintiffs out of business. In granting defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment, the Court noted that
summary disposition is appropriate if a defendant rebuts con-
145 Id. at 278. In its brief, the plaintiff argued that Cities' participa-
tion in the alleged conspiracy was obtained by these retaliatory threats.
Because the plaintiff made no reference to the theory at trial, the Court
declined to review these contentions or any legal questions they raised.
Id. at 280, n. 16.
146 Id. at 286-88. The Cities decision represented an affirmation of
the Sherman Act's deference to independent business judgment. The
Supreme Court first sanctioned a business judgment defense in Theatre
Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. In that case, an oper-
ator of a suburban movie theatre alleged that certain movie producers
and distributors had conspired to restrict showings of first-run films to
downtown theatres. While conceding that evidence of conspiracy
existed, the plaintiff contended that the defendant's behavior created an
inference of a conspiracy to drive the plaintiff from the first-run movie
market. The defendants responded that downtown theatres simply
offered several business advantages, including access to a larger audi-
ence by virtue of the availability of public transportation downtown.
Accordingly, the Court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1953).
For a careful analysis of cases addressing the business judgment
standard, see Note, "Conscious Parallelism: The Business Judgment
Defense in a Summary Judgment Context," 35 HASTINGS L.J. 115
(1983).
147 538 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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spiracy allegations with probative evidence showing "legitimate
business reasons" for the defendant's conduct.'48 Likewise, in
Consolidated Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Anchor Savings Asso-
ciation, the Court held that when the record poses a variety of
nonconspiratorial motives for the defendants' acts, rooted in
business judgment, the defendants are entitled to summary
judgment.149
In considering the impact of Cities Services and its progeny
on the rules for granting summary judgment in antitrust con-
spiracies cases, it is important to note the quantity as well as the
character of the evidence presented by a successful movant. In
Cities, the Court granted the defendant's motion when it found
"overwhelming" evidence that Cities' motives arose in the exer-
cise of business judgment rather than pursuant to a conspir-
acy. 1' 0 In Solinger, the defendants presented clear evidence that
the supposed beneficiary of the alleged conspiracy to prevent
sales to the plaintiff simply made the defendants a better
148 Id. at 409.
149 480 F. Supp. 640 (D. Kan. 1979). In Consolidated, the plaintiffs
wanted to provide hazard insurance for property securing mortgages
that defendant banks originated. The plaintiffs did not, however, have
the financial resources to meet the defendant's standards for property
insurers, and defendants purchased insurance elsewhere. Subsequently,
the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy between the banks and the govern-
ment agencies to whom the bankers sold mortgages.
In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court noted that the government agencies purchasing the bank's mort-
gages justifiably established an objective standard to identify acceptable
hazard insurance carriers for the mortgages it purchased. Without the
standards, the agency would be required to scrutinize the financial sta-
bility of the thousands of insurance companies providing hazard insur-
ance. Because the banks wanted to sell mortgages they originated to
these government agencies, they unilaterally adopted the agencies' stan-
dards. 480 F. Supp. 640, 647-48. The defendants therefore had no mali-
cious intentions toward the plaintiffs, but instead acted pursuant to
their legitimate business interests. 480 F. Supp. at 650.
15o First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S.
253, 277-284 (1967).
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offer.' In Consolidated, after noting that summary judgment
may be granted when defendants have introduced "extensive
and substantial evidence" negating a plaintiff's conspiracy the-
ory the Court held that the defendants lawfully refused to do
business with the plaintiffs out of their legitimate concerns for
the plaintiffs' solvency."
Conclusion
With its decision in Matsushita, the Supreme Court has
apparently changed the standards for opposing a defendant's
motion for summary judgment in a Section One conspiracy case.
In extending Monsanto, the Court has made the plaintiff's task
of surviving a summary judgment motion significantly more
difficult. By requiring a demonstration that an alleged conspiracy
makes economic sense to a trial judge, the Court has adopted a
rule that no longer requires a judge to determine merely whether
an issue of material fact exists, but instead invites a judge to
weigh the conflicting economic theories of the parties.
Additionally, the Court's decision has created an unprincipled
distinction in the standards of proof of conspiracy that civil
plaintiffs and criminal prosecutors must meet. The Court's deci-
sion effectively makes it easier for a prosecutor to prove his case
than for a civil plaintiff to obtain jury review.
Finally, the Court misapplied the Cities standard with regard
to nature of the motive that a plaintiff must demonstrate to
survive a summary judgment motion under conscious parallelism
principles. Notwithstanding the Matsushita Court's conclusions,
the Cities rule does not require a court to consult its favorite
economists to divine the absence of a defendant's motive to
conspire. Rather, Cities merely requires an inquiry into the facial
realities of the business environment.
151 Solinger v. A. & M. Records, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 402, 409 (N.D.
Calif. 1982).
152 See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
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If Matsushita represented merely a choice between conflicting
interpretations of the Sherman Act, its illogic could be accepted
or, perhaps, legislatively overruled without alarm. But the deci-
sion reflects broader political questions about the traditional role
and power of juries in our democratic system to adjudicate
private property rights and the attempt by the executive branch to
infect otherwise private disputes with its noninterventionist ideol-
ogy, thereby transforming the judiciary from its essential nonac-
tivist role.
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